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1 Introduction 
Lifelines can be defined as critical infrastructure systems, which provide a reliable flow of 
services and goods that are essential to the economic, social, and political security communities. 
From the civil engineering point of view, lifelines can be grouped into five principal systems: 
electric power, gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, and water supply. The 
links among different networks increase the potential of cascading failures, which can bring up 
catastrophic amplification of the impact. 
Critical infrastructure systems are dependent and interdependent in multiple ways, where 
dependency refers to the unidirectional relationship and interdependency indicates the 
bidirectional interaction. They usually present upstream-downstream relationships and loop 
relationships, which turn the infrastructures’ behavior into non-linear and non-stationary 
behavior. Several authors have provided different classifications (Table 1) of lifelines 
interdependencies. The first classification, which is still widely accepted, is the one given by 
Rinaldi [1]. In accordance with the period in which it was published, this classification refers 
only to interdependencies among physical lifelines. More recent classifications, like the one 
suggested by Cimellaro [2], take into account the interdependencies between both physical and 
Abstract: Lifelines are critical infrastructure systems with high interdependency. 
During a disaster, the interdependency between the lifelines can lead to cascading 
failures. In the literature, the approaches used to analyze infrastructure 
interdependencies within the social, political, and economic domains do not 
properly describe the infrastructures’ emergency management. During an 
emergency, the response phase is very condensed in time, and the failures that occur 
are usually amplified through cascading effects in the long-term period. Because of 
these peculiarities, interdependencies need to be modeled considering the time 
dimension. The methodology proposed in this paper is based on a modified version 
of the Input-output Inoperability Model. The lifelines are modeled using graph 
theory, and perturbations are applied to the elements of the graph, simulating natural 
or man-made disasters. The cascading effect among the interdependent networks 
has been simulated using a spatial multilayer approach. The adjancency tensor has 
been used to for the temporal dimension and its effects. Finally, the numerical results 
of the simulations with the proposed model are represented by probabilities of 
failure for each node of the system. As a case study, the methodology has been 
applied to a nuclear power plant. The model can be adopted to run analysis at 
different scales, from the regional to the local scales. 
 
  
non-physical lifelines, and they are more appropriate for the evaluation of the overall level of 
resilience of a community.  
Table 1: Types of interdependencies according to different authors 
Authors Types of interdependence 
Rinaldi et al. [1] Physical, Cyber, Geographic, Logical 
Zimmerman [3] Functional, Spatial 
Dudenhoeffer et al. [4] Physical, Geospatial, Policy, Informational 
Wallace et al. [5] Input, Mutual, Shared, Exclusive, Co-located 
Zhang ad Peeta [6] Functional, Physical, Budgetary, Market and Economic 
Cimellaro et al. [2] Physical, Cyber, Geographical, Policy/Procedural, Societal, Budgetary, 
Market & Economy 
Different modeling and simulation approaches have been developed to analyze the 
interdependency. The approaches are mainly classified into five groups: (i) system dynamics 
based models; (ii) network based models; (iii) empirical approaches; (iv) agent based models; 
(v) economic theory based models. A description of these types of models with their advantages 
and disadvantages can be found in Cimellaro (2016) [7] and in Ouyang (2014) [8]. 
However, none of the previous classifications and models analyzes the effect of the time 
dimension. Time dependent analyses are required when the temporal inhomogeneity matters 
and the sequence of events is important. This is usually the case of emergencies, where the 
importance of dependencies changes according to the needs of the community [9].  
This paper proposes a new method based on the Input-output Inoperability Method. The 
method falls under the category of the economic theory based models [10]. The classic IIM is 
a static model, thus it is not able to manage dynamic dependencies. Many authors have 
overcome this limitation with extensions of the original IIM [11] [12] [13], while in the 
proposed approach the IIM has been modified using the approach of temporal networks. In the 
literature, there are several studies on temporal networks, which are summarized in Holme and 
Saramäky’s work [14].  Here, the use of temporal networks is adopted to model the cascading 
effects between critical infrastructures using a spatial multilayer environment.  
2 Modelling temporal networks 
To consider the effect of time on networks, it is required to have a model capable of 
representing the condition of the system at every time step. The methodology proposed in this 
paper is presented below. 
2.1 Input-output Inoperability Method and its limitations 
Developed by Haimes and Jiang [10], the IIM model is an adaptation of the Leontief’s input- 
output (I-O) analysis of economic interdependencies [15]. The IIM proposed in this paper is 
intended to simulate the propagation of the inoperability risk in the infrastructure sector. The 
inoperability is defined as the inability for a system to perform its intended function. 
Mathematically, it ranges between 0 and 1: when 0 means that the element is functioning at full 
capacity, while 1 signifies a completely inoperativity of the element. The Equation describing 
the IIM is presented below: 
  
1
q I A c

    (1) 
where q is the damage vector which contains the inoperability values for the n infrastructures 
considered; A is a matrix which depicts the extent of interdependence among infrastructures 
and it is the transpose of the adjacency matrix describing the topology of the system; I is the 
  
identity matrix; c is the scenario vector that includes the effects of the disruption event (e.g. 
natural disaster, man-made attack, intrinsic failure, etc.) on each infrastructure. The damage 
vector q is the output of the model and it represents the level of inoperability of the 
infrastructures composing the system according to the topology described by the A-matrix. Each 
element of this matrix indicates the influence of the j-th infrastructure on the i-th infrastructure, 
and can range between 1 (i.e. complete propagation of the scenario from j to i) and 0 (i.e. no 
propagation).  
To give an example of which are the outputs of the IIM, the case of a six-node network 
developed by Valencia [16] is reported (from now onwards it will be referred to as Example 1). 
There are two networks, an electric and a water network, serving three buildings (Figure 1a). 
The hazard considered is infrastructure aging. To measure the impact of any node decay across 
the network, the column summation of the damage vector q of each node i at each time t is 
computed. This is the decay score (Equation (2)): 
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This approach, which is applied to a complex infrastructure network, presents three 
important limitations: (i) it does not take into account the redundancies of the system; (ii) it 
does not consider the temporal evolution of the system; (iii) its inputs and outputs are not 
significant probabilistic quantities. 
 
                    (a)         (b) 
Figure 1: Graph representing Example 1 and Example 2 topology 
If in the system of Figure 1a, a new pump house is added in parallel to the first one, the 
network presents a redundancy. Figure 1b shows the new topology of Example 2. It is clear that 
the performance of the system is improved with respect to the previous case. We expect that 
the impact of the water tower and of the electrical source remains the same, while the impact 
of each of the pump houses decreases. But if we compare the results obtained with the one-
pump case, the expected trends are not met.  
To solve the problems related to redundancies, probabilities of nodes in parallel can be 
combined properly. In the previous case, the dc_s of the electrical source and the water tower 
are increasing because the algorithm sees another node (the new pump) that needs to be 



















where ni is the number of redundant nodes of node i. After having expanded it to the n-
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
     (4) 
After this operation, the values of the dc_s of the electrical source and water tower return to the 
expected values. 
Now it is necessary to introduce an index able to represent the performance of the entire 
system: the system score. It is a dimensionless risk index that varies in the range 0 ÷ ∞. It 
expresses the rating of a system of infrastructures, at the time t. Equation (5) defines it: 











  (5) 
where k is the type of node (i.e. electrical sources, water towers and pump houses). The final 
targets (i.e. buildings) are not considered when calculating the sys_s. A low value of the sys_s 
indicates that the system of infrastructures has low risk of target nodes’ failure, while a high 
value indicates high risk.  
2.2 Modified IIM for Temporal Networks 
Graph theory has been used to model the infrastructure networks. The geographical, 
topological, and flow information of a network can be represented with a graph G(V, E) which 
is formed by a set V of vertices (or nodes) and a set E of edges (or links). The characterization 
of the nodes depends on the spatial scale of the considered problem, which might be an entire 
infrastructure [17], a sub-system or even a unit. To each node specific features such as 
hierarchy, resistance and autonomy can be attributed, while edges do not have any features 
assigned, but they are oriented. Moreover, the edges can link nodes intra-network (i.e. within 
a specific infrastructure) or inter-networks (i.e. across different infrastructures). The last one 
represents the interdependencies described in the A-matrix. Any inter-network link will be 
specified as Boolean, either 0 or 1. Thus axi yj values will be 0 if the x-th node belonging to the 
i-th infrastructure is not dependent on the y-th node belonging to the j-th infrastructure. 
In addition to the existing formulations, the concept of chains has been introduced in 
the model. A chain is a sequence of nodes from one vertex to another through some edges. 
The chains of interest are those that connect a source (i.e. a node without inflows) to a sink 
(i.e. a node without outflows). It is assumed that every node of a chain must have at most 
one inflow edge, but can have multiple outflow edges. The hierarchy of the chains is defined 
by the design of the infrastructure.  
The proposed methodology modifies the IIM deterministic formulation in probabilistic 
terms. The probability of failure of a single node is obtained by combining the natural hazard 
with the infrastructure vulnerability and it refers to the status of the node itself after the 
perturbation. Hereinafter it will be called self-failure probability (Psf) and will substitute the 
scenario vector c. The hazard component is represented by an event vector E(n x 1), where n 
is the number of nodes in the system. The elements of the E-vector can be physical quantities 
such as the pga, pgv, pgd, the wave height of a tsunami, etc. Moreover, they can change from 
node to node, because infrastructures usually have a large spatial extension (Figure 2a). By 
performing different simulations, using different E-vectors it is possible to approach the 
problem in probabilistic terms. Each simulation has a weight, which is directly taken from 
the hazard curves. The vulnerability of each node is represented by the fragility curves (Figure 
2b), and for each node there are as many fragility curves as the types of hazard acting. The 
probability of failure Psf of a node is obtained inserting the value of the E-vector in the 
fragility curve of the node. The approach proposed by Valencia [16] of summing up the 
elements of the q-vector to obtain a final score to evaluate the interdependency performances 
has obvious limitations, because they are not normalized to the dimension of the system. In 
  
addition, it does not take into account the benefits given by the redundancies. In the modified 
IIM here proposed, the probability of failure Pf  of every node is obtained combining the 
Psf with the cascading failure probability Pcf  which is calculated using a step by step approach 
considering the topology of the system (Figure 2c).  
 
Figure 2: Flowchart of the probabilistic approach. Starting from a network perturbation (a) probabilities of 
failure of nodes are computed on fragility curves (b) and then propagated according to the topology of the 
network (c) 
The more intuitive approach for analyzing a system of infrastructures is solving each 
network separately and then considering their interaction. Then, infrastructure networks are 
shown as layers, which overlap each other and share some nodes. Considering Example 1, the 
element pump needs both electricity and water. Using layer’s visualization, a single node will 
be projected in the two layers and a virtual edge will link the two projections (Figure 3). 
Another issue to deal with is that the IIM can only use square matrices, while the inter-
networks matrices are usually rectangular. To overcome this limitation, Valencia [16] suggests 
the introduction of a rectangular I-matrix. The idea is to increase the values of c-vector of 
the i-th infrastructure, by adding the q-vector computed for the j-th network (Equation (6)).  
 ·
T
j i j i j ic I q c    (6) 
 
Figure 3: Example of layer subdivision for interdependent networks 
Inserting the output of the first network into the input of the second one is the correct 
approach for the evaluation of the cascading effects. However, this formulation starts from the 
same deterministic values of before. The current method involves the combination of the Pcf 
of upstream and downstream networks (Equation (7)): 
  
  * ·
j ii
T
j i ccf f cfI PP P   (7) 
where the P*cfi can be considered cascading-failure probability which incorporates in the node 
all the information coming from upstream networks and nodes. 
What has not been addressed yet is the temporal dimension. Therefore a timeline τ = {t0 , 
t1, t2, · · · , T } is introduced. The time step ∆t of the elements of the τ -vector represents the 
time necessary for the propagation of the events across the entire system. Given this timeline, 
it is clear that to each event must be associated a time and that the model must run at every 
time step. Now the model is not stationary but is made up of temporal networks, denoted as 
a time dependent graph G(t) = G(V, E(t)) . The Pf of nodes changes over time, in accordance 
with the sequence of events.  
 
Figure 4: Temporal variance of Operability Labels. Disruptive events tend to change their value and decrease 
the overall probability of operability (ΣPocc) 
The adopted strategy is to pass from bi-dimensional matrixes to a tri-dimensional tensor 
notation. The topology of every network is now described by an adjacency tensor, whose 
elements are axi yi(t). Each different temporal layer of the A-tensor represents a possible 
chain. To better understand which of the chains is active at the time t¯ , the probability of 
occurrence of a specific configuration Pocc is assigned to every layer (Figure 4). This value 
expresses if the layer is on (Pocc = 1), or off (Pocc = 0) at the considered time step. The 
condition to be on is that, in the current configuration, target nodes do not fail and that 
configurations with higher degree of hierarchy are off. Transferring this concept to the 
probabilistic model means that the values of Pocc become probabilities of being active. The 
sum of the probability of occurrence of a network is 0 ≤ ΣPocc ≤ 1 and the term 1−ΣPocc 
represents the loss of capacity of the network (LoC). 
3 Case study 
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster has been selected to conduct the case 
study. The earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power 
station on March 11, 2011, knocked out backup power systems that were needed to cool the 
  
reactors, causing three of them to be subjected to fuel melting, hydrogen explosions, and 
radiations.  
3.1 Modelling the Nuclear Power Plant 
The aim is to obtain a model of a nuclear power plant equipped with a Boiling Water 
Reactor (BWR), similar to the one in Fukushima. The topology and data regarding the 
disrupting events affecting the system are inspired by the Fukushima case study. However, the 
parameters of the system’s components are generic and taken from the literature. 
The plant scheme of the Unit 1 (furnished by TEPCO) was used as a reference for building 
the nuclear power plant model. Inthis paragraph, the water and the electic networks are taken 
into account. The first networks is at the local scale, while the second one expands from the 
regional to the local scale.  
 
Figure 5: Simplified model for lifelines serving a nuclear power plant 
Two different models are here presented: the first is simplified, the second is more 
detailed. The simplified model is shown in Figure 5 and is composed of an electric and a water 
network. The first emergency cooling systems consists of the Isolation Condenser (IC), which 
cools the steam coming from the reactor in a pool and does not need electricity. After this 
step, the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) can cool the core in emergency 
conditions. It can draw water from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) or from the 
Suppression Pool (SP) and then injects it into the core. The pump used by this system is steam-
driven. The IC and HPCI systems were considered not dependent on electricity in the 
simplified model. However, in reality they are indirectly dependent on it because of the 
presence of electric valves. 
To better model the eventual human interventions on the system, other three networks have 
been added: the telecommunication, the transportation, and the emergency services network. 
All the layers of this new detailed model are interdependent, as shown in Figure 6. Nodes 
have been classified according to their location and altitude, so that for each one it is possible 
to estimate the intensity of the event. Regarding earthquake and tsunami fragility functions, 
most of them has been taken from ATC-13 Earthquake damage evaluation data for California 
[18]. Other earthquake fragility curves have been taken from the ALA report [19] and from 
the HAZUS database [20]. Tsunami fragility curves have been considered as linear functions 
between two values from the ATC-13 recommendations. The autonomy curves have been 
modelled as step functions where the step is located in correspondence to the nominal value 
  
indicated by Hitachi-GE [21]. 
 
 
Figure 6: Interdependent layers of the detailed model for lifelines serving a nuclear power plant 
3.2 Analysis of the system 
This section shows the results relative to the electric network of both the simplified and 
the detailed models. In the simplified model, the earthquake is responsible for the collapse of 
the AC transmission line. This leads to the loss of off-site AC power, which represents the first 
configuration of the electric network. The electric network assumes another configuration so 
that the power supply is still guaranteed to the water network. The arrival of the tsunami 
drastically changes the situation. The Diesel generators and the ordinary cooling line are out 
of order. Batteries are damaged too, but there is no need of them anymore since the pumps 
that they were feeding are failed. IC backup cooling system is kicked off and the probability 
of failure of the reactor core cooling is still close to 0. Ten hours after the earthquake, the 
autonomy of the IC starts to decrease and it is substituted by the HPCI system. As the 
probability of failure of the IC increases, the probability of failure of the reactor core 
increases as well, because it now relies on the HPCI system, which was seriously damaged 
by the earthquake and the tsunami. Figure 7 contains all these information. 
Similar to the previous model, in the detailed model, the earthquake is responsible for the 
shutdown of the NPP turbine and to the off-site AC power. Electricity is still provided by 
diesel generators which feed the RHR system and the control room. Damages caused by the 
earthquake to emergency cooling systems imply that the first three backup lines have a 
probability of occurrence Pocc≠ 0, but on the other hand the most likely to be active is the RHR. 
After the tsunami, the diesel tanks, CSTs, and seawater pumps are completely damaged. 
Afterwards,  the water network  switches to the IC and HPCI configurations, but the 
control of their valves DC power is needed. The batteries have a relevant probability of 
failure, so the loss of capacity sharply increases. After three hours, valves are manually 
opened and the cooling is provided by the IC, until its autonomy runs out and brings to a 
complete loss of capacity (Figure 8). 
Results show that both the models can effectively reproduce the ongoing situation for the 
electric network. There are no large differences because the differences between the two 
models are just the number of power panels and the split of target nodes’ supply lines. Target 
nodes cannot propagate upstream, and therefore this has no effect. Looking at the water 
network’s results, there are some differences because different sources feed different 
configurations of the water network. For this reason, the simplified model is not reliable.  
  
 
Figure 7: Probability of occurrence for the electric network, simplified model 
 
Figure 8: Probability of occurrence for the electric network, detailed model 
4 Concluding remarks 
Lifelines are a crucial part of society and their operability is fundamental for the wellbeing 
of the community. To reduce costs related to their failure and recovery, it is important to 
intervene on their vulnerability. Considering the system’s components as independent 
elements is not realistic because the interdependencies and the cascading effects play a 
major role. This work introduces a modified Input-output Inoperability Method containing 
three implementations of the traditional IIM. Firstly, a probabilistic approach is used. The 
model deals with hazard curves, fragility functions and probabilities of failure, which are 
quantities much easier to combine and understand than the ones of the original IIM. The 
second step is the adoption of a multilayer approach for modelling different interdependent 
networks. This allows a rapid and intuitive combination of analyses of separate networks, and 
at the same time gives the perception of the interdependencies’ role in the dynamics of failure. 
The third and major implementation is the adoption of a tensor notation with the aim of 
taking into account the temporal dimension of the problem.  
The methodology has been tested on a real case study. Lifelines serving the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant has been modeled, from the regional to the building scale.  To validate 
the model, results has been compared with the information related to the 2011 disaster. The 
results obtained with a simplified model are not entirely reliable, while a detailed mode could 
fit the situations occurred with a relatively low approximation. 
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